I. Introduction
The mainstream view on industrial policy -government interventions to shift the structure of production towards particular sectors -has been something of a pendulum.
In the middle part of the last century, industrial policy was widespread. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the strategy of import substitution -maintaining high tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imported products, mostly finished goods, in order to increase the domestic demand for locally produced products -was common practice to nurture "infant industries" throughout the Asia, Africa, Latin America, and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). A wide array of industrial and investment policies were utilized throughout most of the developing world (and in parts of the industrialized world) to expand countries' industrial bases and develop key sectors.
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In some cases, industrial policy implemented over the 20th century seemed to yield astounding results, including in MENA countries, but perhaps nowhere more so than in a few high-performing East Asian economies, especially in Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan. The exact interventions varied, but included targeting and subsidizing credit to selected industries, keeping deposit rates low and maintaining ceilings on borrowing rates to increase profits and retained earnings, protecting domestic import substitutes, subsidizing declining industries, establishing and financially supporting government banks, making public investments in applied research, establishing firm-and industry- 1 The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of its authors, and should not be attributed to the World Bank. 2 While the term "industrial policy" -with its origins in the fact that countries were concerned with developing their industrial sectors -is still used, today the term has become more broadly recognized to include policies that encourage any sector (such as agriculture, or tourism) -not only the industrial sector.
specific export targets, developing export marketing institutions, and sharing information widely between public and private sectors. Some industries were promoted while others were not.3
By the 1980s, however, the mainstream view on industrial policies had decidedly changed. More and more evidence was found that traditional approaches to industrial policy led to misallocation of labor and capital across industries and did not improve long-run growth in total factor productivity, but gave rise to rent-seeking. Even among the high-performing economies of East Asia, it was argued that industrial policiesnotwithstanding the contribution to the growth of the economies themselves -wreaked significant costs on the economies in the form of corruption and weak financial systems.
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In Europe and the US frequent 'picking the loser' experiences in declining industries such as agriculture, textile, steel, and shipbuilding reinforced this notion. But other factors -including the wide acceptance of the "Washington Consensus" of reforms for
Latin America, the fall of the Soviet Union, and an increasing globalized economy, contributed to industrial policy falling from favor in most development circles.
Despite these views against industrial policy, most of the countries in the MENA region continued to maintain policies of strong government intervention in production and economic planning throughout the 1980s and 1990s. While countries in Latin America and Europe and Central Asia undertook sweeping reforms of their economic structures over the 1980s and 1990s, MENA economies made relatively limited progress to move toward more market-oriented trade and industrial policies, despite
In the past few years, the stance against industrial policy has swung back somewhat. Although economists agree that market forces and private entrepreneurship need to be the driving forces behind growth and productivity enhancements, the "excessive pessimism" about the ability of the state which characterized the 1980s and 1990s (resulting in a minimalist conception of the role of the state confined to the 3 World Bank (1993) . 4 See, for example, Noland and Pack (2003) .
provision of secure property rights, sound money, adequate primary education, and some infrastructure 5 ) has been increasingly replaced by the more moderate view that industrial policies can complement -not simply distort -market forces, 6 a view purported even among those in the Bretton-Woods institutions which most fervently denounced state intervention two decades prior.
A recent speech by Anne Krueger, deputy managing director for the International
Monetary Fund, for example, argues that the industrial policies adopted in East Asia, by encouraging export-oriented sectors, may actually have perpetuated more broad-based reform. For exporters to be able to compete in international markets, the scope for protection against intermediate or capital goods imports was reduced, since exporters needed access to these goods at the lowest possible cost. Tariffs and quantitative barriers would have prevented such access, and as a result, export success required a relatively liberal trade regime 7 .
Why has the view on industrial policy changed? In part, it has reflected a general disillusionment with the orthodox agenda advocated in the Washington Consensus, which for many countries has failed to deliver the expected results. And in part, it has to do with the fact that the international experiences with industrial policy have been far from uniform. Although there are ample examples where industrial policy strategies have resulted in failures, there are many cases where the use of industrial policy, in conjunction with an enabling environment for growth, has helped to promote industries which have expanded to growth clusters. In Chile, for example, the government played an active catalytic role in the development of the synthetic salmon industry which helped to boost production more than tenfold within a decade. Today Chile has emerged as the third largest producer of farmed or synthetic salmon in the world while the industry accounts for than 6 percent of the countries exports. Perhaps what has become most clear from the diversity of experiences is that industrial policy depends enormously on the national context, which determines how industrial policies are framed and implemented. Ultimately, the political economy will
determine not only what types of industrial policy will be pursued, it may also determine whether a given set of strategic industrial policies will benefit one country while it will harm another.
In this paper, we examine the political economy and consequences of industrial policy in the MENA region. Unlike in many other regions, industrial policy in MENA developed within the context of the region's strong "social contract" between the government and its people. Although industrial development was an objective, it at times took a backseat to the more important goals of social transformation and economic redistribution -which influenced not only the types and success of industrial policies adopted, but also critically influenced the balance of power among interest groups.
Despite the mounting strains on MENA's economic development models, oil and strategic revenues, and the lack of a full-fledged economic crisis, have allowed the region to maintain industrial policies far longer than other regions. Equally important, the lack of interest groups to emerge and press for change has hindered the region's move toward more functional, market friendly policies for growth. As internal and external forces shape the way industrial policies can be used in the globalized economy, the MENA region's old style of industrial policy will need to adjust. The ultimate path of change will be determined greatly by each country's initial conditions and individual political economy factors.
II. Understanding industrial policy
What exactly constitutes "industrial policy"? In the current vernacular, any policies or interventions which influence how industries expand are referred to as "industrial policies", but distinctions are made between "horizontal" industrial policies and "vertical" industrial policies. Interventions which are differentially applied across sectors of the economy are referred to as "vertical policy". Likewise, interventions which are applied across the board are referred to as "horizontal policy."
While vertical p olicies essentially target the economic output of specific industries and even firms, horizontal policies essentially focus on improving the quality of inputs in the production process, which presumably would benefit all firms.
Horizontal industrial policies often cited include promoting education and vocational training, building appropriate and efficient public infrastructure, encouraging international technology transfers, and fostering research and development.
However, while the differentiation between those policies which would benefit all firms, versus those that would only have selective reach may appear to be appealing, it is not entirely accurate. Even horizontal policies may have substantially different impacts among sectors of the economy, and may ultimately be just as distortionary as vertical industrial policies. For example, take the case when governments provide across-theboard energy subsidies, lowering the unit price of energy for all consumers. Although this is technically a "horizontal" policy -in that it is applied across sectors -it clearly differentially impacts firms, providing greater benefits to more strongly energy-intensive (and often energy-inefficient) firms. Even a more "virtuous" horizontal policy, such as incentives for promoting education, will differentially impact sectors of the economy depending upon what types of education are being promoted -indeed, some firms will not benefit from a more educated at all. Thus, the line between "horizontal" and "vertical" industrial policy, it turns out, is often very difficult to distinguish. But despite these difficulties, this distinction is still useful, especially from a political economy perspective, in order to try to understand the strong political appeal of vertical industrial policy compared to the horizontal perspective.
A useful starting point for why countries adopt primarily vertical versus horizontal policies is to understand some of the economic arguments behind both approaches. Ultimately, while the political economy may play as great -if not greatera role in determining the industrial policy approach adopted, economic justifications have provided a strong foundation for the road countries have traveled toward industrial development.
Economic justifications of vertical industrial policy
There have been a variety of economic justifications for the use of vertical industrial policy. One of the most notable economic justifications was the infant industry argument for selective trade protection. This argument claims that trade protection is warranted for newly established domestic industries in countries where production costs may be initially higher than those of well-established foreign competitors. If, over time, new domestic producers can experience cost reductions due to learning by doing, they can end up attaining the production efficiency of their foreign rivals. Without the initial protection, however, the domestic industry will never take off.
But many other economic justifications for vertical industrial policy have been advanced as well. One argument is that coordination problems of either upstream or downstream investments may hinder the development of otherwise competitive industries. This is exemplified by the development of the orchid industry in Taiwan,   9 where potential orchid growers contemplating investment into greenhouses needed to be assured that a variety of fixed investments were in place -including an electrical grip, irrigation, logistics and transport, and pest control measures. At the same time, all of these services had high fixed costs and were unlikely to be undertaken by the private sector without assurances of sufficient greenhouses to demand their services. In this case, the Taiwanese government's investments upstream aimed to coax the downstream investments in greenhouses.
Information externalities may restrict a country's self-discovery of which activities have a low enough cost to be profitable. Unlike innovation, which can be protected with patents, the costs (risks) to benefits ratio for starting an internationally well-established industry domestically is high. India's socialist industrial policy that was pursued in the 1950s, for example, with protectionist policies increasing the cost of unskilled labor, shut the country out of the global market for manufacturing products with unskilled labor for many years after the country ultimately opened up. 11 Korea's use of credit allocation as an instrument of its industrial policies is widely blamed for the crisis that emerged in the financial system in the late 1990s. Commercial banks were urged to lend to firms in preferred sectors or to the large and powerful conglomerates ("cronies"). In result, banks incurred weak balance sheets as a result of the low profitability of these firms. The policy nearly obviated bank skills for project monitoring and evaluation. Consequently the huge capital inflows which began in the mid-1990s were channeled through institutions that had suffered a serious erosion of skills and discipline.
12 10 Rodrik (2004) 11 As it turns out, the country found its niche in sunrise industries with high knowledge content. But the best of intentions with industrial policy have often produced the most disastrous outcomes. 12 Borensztein and Lee (2005) and Pack (2000) .
In addition to the ability to "get it wrong", vertical industrial policy is subject to two potential (and common) damaging side effects: rent-seeking and corruption. Wherever the government makes selective interventions, which could contribute to the development of one sector or firm versus another, there is the potential for interest groups to attempt to sway policy in their direction and utilize that policy for personal gain. The ability for countries to control corruption and rent seeking, in fact, is a key difference between countries in which industrial policy could be utilized effectively and those where the strategy floundered. But the types of interest groups that emerge in a country, the mechanisms they can use to influence public policy, and the amount that they can divert industrial policy from "good" to "bad" can vary enormously from country to country.
Economic justifications of horizontal industrial policy
While market failures, information asymmetries, externalities, and problems of coordination and learning are among the most commonly cited elements for government intervention, the advantages of addressing these issues with an horizontal policy perspective rather than a sector/firm specific one has been gaining acceptance by policy makers in the developing world.
Horizontal industrial policies may have many advantages over vertical policies.
These advantages can be clustered in two classes. On the one side, horizontal policies tend to reduce the distortions generated by the use of vertical industrial policy. They approach industrial policy from an angle that is closer to competition policies while still actively supporting the economy. Horizontal policies are applied across the board. As such they tend to level the playing field across firms, industries and sectors, rather than giving a privileged position to some groups. Because of their "universal" nature, they also tend to reduce rent seeking incentives as well as to limit corruption opportunities.
This reduces the development of pressure/lobbing groups that seek to benefit from policies targeted to their interest. Horizontal industrial policies also increase transparency by eliminating the need for backroom politics and promote social cohesion as they can be seen as spreading the benefits across the full spectrum of society instead of concentrating them within specific groups. In addition they can promote efficiency and competition among firms, industries and sectors in the economy, as each of these agents will have greater incentives to internalize the most from the horizontal policies
On the other side, horizontal industrial policies can serve to reduce the problem of state capture and government failure. Because these policies are applied across the board, they can eliminate some of the problems that help perpetuate the use of vertical policies. The distribution of benefits is more clearly defined with horizontal policies and the problems of non neutrality are in principle eliminated (or at least reduced) with the use of this type on industrial policy. However, it is important to note that while policies can be horizontal in design and nature, their incidence may not be horizontal. The energy subsidy example above clearly indicates a case in which a horizontal policy may have a "vertical" outcome.
Finally, horizontal industrial policy, contrary to the traditional vertical policy is easier to adjust to changing market conditions since its benefits are not captured by special groups whose vested interest would lobby to maintain the status quo. This builds a much needed dynamism in the policy itself, facilitating change and adjustment when needed.
Political economy of industrial policy
The traditional political economy view of economic reform is based on public choice theory and the idea of interest groups and coalitions as rent seekers that pursue politically mediated economic gains. The theory assumes that the purpose of reform is to eliminate rent seeking, which is seen as an unproductive activity. Policy reform then helps to disrupt existing political coalitions and dislocate privileged economic actors. First, the benefits from horizontal policies tend to be diffuse across groups and sectors, and it is not often easy to mobilize "winners" from horizontal policies. Take, for example, the case for education, skills development and technological innovation policies. Although many businesses might benefit from skills upgrading, the extent to which a given firm could reasonably expect to benefit from across the board education policies might be small -a great deal of the resources might be devoted to skills development outside those used intensively in their own business. It is difficult to see collective action emerge to support these generalized policies systematically. On the other hand, within a particular sector, the types of skills utilized and technological knowledge needed is often highly specific. As a result, firms in a given sector are probably more likely to be able to develop lobbying power to pursue specific educational objectives.
Second, some of the most important horizontal policies are of a long term nature, and it often takes a long time for results to materialize. This is particularly the case for education and research and development of a general nature (not sector specific). Interest groups are unlikely to pursue and push such policies when the benefits to them are less visible and spread out over a long period of time. It is governments who are left to be the most active in defining and supporting these policies, when policies have a long term perspective on development.
Third, in many instances, market and coordination failures are sector specific, and cannot be adequately addressed through horizontal approaches. Take the case of the tourism sector in which coordination problems are pervasive. The emergence and/or expansion (new zones, new business niches) of the sector requires coordination along a number of dimensions: (i) development of basic infrastructure. such as zones with adequate water supply, sanitation, access to international transport, and the like;
(ii) development of specific technical and managerial skills; (iii) development of joint or support activities such as travel agencies, entertainment businesses, restaurants, and related activities; and, (iv) information on markets, advertising and opening of new markets. Given the number of factors which must come together for development of the sector, it is unlikely that market forces and mechanisms would be able to resolve all of these coordination problems. Typically, governments have to be involved.
Finally, arguments used by sector lobbies can often be couched in terms of benefits to other groups, such as workers and consumers, strengthening their political power. Tariff protection for a specific sector is often couched in terms of domestic jobs protected. Protection of agricultural production and subsidies for European farmers is couched in terms of preserving the environment and livelihood of weak farmers.
Protection of domestic production of many food products such as meat is couched in terms of health safety for consumers. These arguments cannot be made for blanket horizontal policies. They are intrinsically product-and sector-specific, and they have a powerful political thrust.
Lessons from reforms in the developing world (including the MENA region)
indicate that in many instances pre-reform elites are resilient. Privileged economic actors have been able to keep their (privileged) positions after reforms. The process of reform has been one of reorganizing opportunities for rent seeking, rather than eliminating them.
Reforms have produced outcomes that continue to provide significant opportunities for privileged economic actors to capture the rents from a set of regulatory arrangements and economic institutions.
A new approach to the political economy of policy reform is emerging. This new approach focuses on the so-called networks of privilege. 14 In this view economic actors view shifts in economic policy as consequential to their interests and try to shape the policy reform. Rent-seeking is no longer an unproductive and predatory behavior but a normal activity in the political economy environment. Reform is used to reorganize opportunities for rent seeking, which in turn can be used to promote reforms aimed at improving economic performance. Economic policy is driven by private rather than While understanding the reasons the widespread "acceptance" of this type of social contract in MENA countries is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that it had significant implications for the type of industrial policies which were implemented. Four mechanisms/features of this model of development will shape industrial policy:
• first, sweeping nationalizations of industry, trade and agriculture in the late 1950s and early 1960s, producing a dramatic expansion in the scale of public sectors and reducing the role of the private sector; • second, is the capture wholly or predominantly of the banking and insurance sectors by the state, • third, the choice of price controls and subsidies as a predominant mode of regulation on the basis for the need to protect the poor and pursue a social agenda of redistribution, • and finally, the role of oil wealth -both oil resources for oil-producing economies, and oil-related revenues 16 for resource poor economiesunderwriting much of the region's emerging social contracts, and the public sector (both governments and state-owned enterprises) becoming a key vehicle for redistribution through employment. While this trend may be clearer in the oil sectors, the role of the state in most of the MENA countries has been dominant, comparable at times to the command economies of the former Soviet block. 17 As a result of these trends, by the 1960s, the commanding heights -the means of production -were mostly in the hands of the state in many MENA countries.
Within the predominant role of the sate and use of central planning as the main vehicle for resource allocation, these features and mechanisms meant that industrial policy was bound to be sectoral/vertical and highly preferential, thus creating an environment of "winners" and "losers."
The public enterprise sector and industrial policy
To a large extent i ndustrial policy was structured to support public sector enterprises. Like many countries of the world that embraced the infant-industry concept in the 1950s, MENA implemented an inward looking model with protection from external competition. Import tariffs, licenses, prohibitions and other forms of non-tariff barriers were used as the direct instruments of choice to support public sector enterprises, but other policies supported public sector production (and employment), including credit rationing, subsidies, and foreign exchange policies.
The nature of public enterprises and their closeness to decision making made the pursuit of sectoral interests relatively easy and the implementation of the incentive schemes straightforward, as most of the instruments c ould be shaped accordingly.
MENA's trade policies of high import tariffs and non-tariff barriers, which limited competition from abroad, echoed strategies adopted elsewhere, protecting industries which hopefully would flourish and compete later on. 18 When despite trade protection these firms made losses, it was easy to cover their losses directly from the budget or more commonly from the banking system.
In situations where the private sector continued to play a role, it often faced distorted incentives and the negative impact of the presence of public enterprises, such as higher cost, low quality, and the like. Under such circumstances, the only way for private businesses to pursue their interests was, in addition to dealing with externalities, to obtain specific incentives in the form of special protection, access to finance or other subsidies.
This process enhanced the vertical and complex nature of industrial policy
Financial sector and industrial policy
In combination with pension and social security funds, bank and non-bank financial institutions were used to collect sizable resources that were managed by the state. Savings were collected at low cost through administered interest rates that were usually negative in real terms. This generated implicit subsidies that were transferred to the privileged priority firms and sectors. Credit was directed by Central Bank command.
Government control of the banking systems made it possible to pursue this vertical industrial policy. Resources of the banking system were directly allocated to selected activities with quota allocations by sectors and preferential access by public enterprises.
Monetary policy was conducted through direct credit allocation and refinancing.
Consumer subsidies and industrial policy
MENA countries also used subsidies as an active policy choice. In part, subsidies and other artificial supports were a necessary part of industrial policy in MENA because of the externalities of the instruments of redistribution. Administered prices which prevailed throughout MENA economies damaged the link between prices and production costs, and compensation techniques became necessary.
During the early stages the most pervasive subsidies were for consumer goods, especially foodstuffs. These subsidies cum price controls meant that specific sector policies were needed for agricultural and food products to compensate for the weakened production incentives. As a result, the agricultural sector required further policy instruments of trade protection, access to preferred bank financing, and subsidies. It was easy to justify these incentives as being critical for employment, protecting the poor and maintaining social peace.
Oil Wealth and Industrial Policy
In addition to supporting the social contract, industrial policy in many MENA countries developed in reaction to the influence of oil wealth. Recognizing the impact that "Dutch Disease" had on the competitiveness of tradeables, governments instituted a range of compensatory policies to mitigate the adverse effects. In a real sense, industrial development in the MENA economies could not take p lace without some direct government interventions. This is most clear for the oil producing economies, but even in the resource-poor economies of the region, the exchange rate appreciation that occurred from the massive inflow of aid and remittances contributed to the view that vertical industrial policies were needed for industrial development.
But additionally, the abundance of oil revenues has given rise to vested interest groups, who have sought to retain a disproportionate flow of the rent and evaluate reform policies for their capacity to be captured. 19 This has perpetuated and motivated the use of more vertical industrial policies. Neither did the region sustain high levels of productivity after the 1960s. MENA experienced two decades of strong economic growth over the 1960s and 1970s (during the 1960s, in fact, MENA's economic growth performance was the strongest in the world). Over the 1960s, productivity growth was strong, in part due to the industrial policies adopted, which allowed the region to utilize underused capacities and provide the early boost of industrialization. But by the 1970s, productivity deteriorated sharply as massive investments were having increasingly poor payoffs in terms of growth. Over both the 1970s and 1980s, productivity growth in the MENA region was negative 21 .
Moreover, full employment -a virtual mainstay of the social contract -could not be maintained, and between the 1980s and 2000, the unemployment rate climbed from an average of less than 8% to 15% 22 . By 2000, the MENA region's unemployment rate was higher than every other region of the world but Sub-Saharan Africa. Under a variety of comparisons, the vertical industrial policies adopted in MENA were no longer a success.
Beyond the economic failures, the industrial policies adopted in MENA had a powerful influence over the emergence and control of interest groups in the region, a fact 20 Muller-Jentsch (2005) . 21 Nabli, Keller and Veganzones (2002) . 22 World Bank (2003b) .
that would greatly determine the continued use of vertical policies well beyond their justification.
IV. The failure to change industrial policy in the 1980s and 1990s
Deteriorating budget deficits and the lack of economic growth prompted a handful of economies in the region -including Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia -to embark in Tables A1 and A2 ). Significant distortions in the tariff schedule continue to exist, especially in Iran, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco (see Table A1 ).
Inefficiencies and distortions of financial sector policies also became apparent, and in many countries of the region, reforms have taken place to liberalize financial systems, and in a limited number of cases even privatize them. 27 In fact, the financial system might well be the policy sphere which has experienced the biggest reduction in the scope of government intervention. of all domestic credit extended (see Table A5 ).
MENA countries also used subsidies as an active policy choice to support their industries (and consumers). Although subsidies were greatly reduced during programs of macroeconomic stabilization, particularly cash subsidies to industries which have been reduced by almost 50%, the levels of subsidies remain high. Studies indicate that subsidies in the form of direct cash transfers to enterprises are significant for MENA countries, albeit not as high as the European Union or in Europe and Central Asia (see Figure A2 ). 29 However, due to the difficulties of measuring subsidies (rates of effective protection and effective assistance are not easily available) cash transfer to industries might be only a weak proxy for the actual level of subsidies, which might well be significantly higher.
27 Jbili, Enders and Treichel (1997) . 28 Iran in the early 2000s. 29 Schwartz and Clements (1999) . The MENA region, although it has experienced a significant decline in growth and employment from the gradual exhaustion of its economic models, has not experienced economic crises in a systemic way. 32 The substantial revenues from oil, which declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s, nonetheless remained large (and of late have spiraled significantly), giving MENA governments and the public a temporary sense of economic health. This, along with foreign aid and strategic rents has permitted MENA governments to maintain damaging vertical industrial policies.
30 Krueger (1993) . 31 Koromzay (2004) . 32 Some countries in the region, like Jordan, have experienced deep economic crisis and as a result have move forward the reform agenda at a faster pace that the region's average.
But equally important, the slow pace of change in the industrial policy mix in the region reflects either a lack of power among those interest groups who might be instrumental in lobbying for a move toward more horizontal industrial policy, or the gradual creation of privileged networks that are influencing policy to retain their rentseeking capacity.
The private sector, rather than challenging the status-quo, has adapted to the prevailing industrial policy mix that has protected state-owned enterprises. Private sector activity is concentrated in a small number of large firms that have benefited from protective policies, along with a number of micro-enterprises, which account for much of employment but have little access to formal finance, markets, or government support programs. This behavior of the emerging private sector has reduced the likelihood for faster reform and policy change.
Trade unions, which could also be an effective vehicle for change, are tightly The industrial export sector, which cares about competitiveness and would more likely lobby for horizontal policies, is grossly underdeveloped, and generally scattered among diverse product groups. In a recent paper looking at the lobby power of the manufacturing sector, 33 when you compare the developing regions of the world, the MENA region ranks last.
And at the same time, other groups which would benefit from more horizontal industrial policies that could stimulate growth and employment -the many young and educated who are unemployed 34 , the small businesses and those young entrepreneurs who seek to enter protected markets and have difficulty accessing finance, small farmers, and the like -have limited ability to unite and lobby the government for change in the industrial policy mix. For these groups to press for more horizontal policies, they require certain rights -such access to information to formulate choices, the ability to mobilize, the ability to contest policies that are poor -which are only weakly present in the MENA region.
Government information is not fully accessible by the public. Freedom of the press is carefully monitored and circumscribed in most countries. There are restrictions on civil society. And the ability to contest government policies is weak. More generally, the MENA region suffers from fundamental weaknesses in governance, both in terms of inclusiveness and public accountability, which have weakened the ability for those who might benefit from more horizontal industrial policies to press for change. In a ranking of more than 170 countries according to some 22 indicators of governance (both in terms of the quality of public administration and in terms of public sector accountability), the MENA region on average ranked in the bottom third of countries worldwide -lower than every other region of the world (see Table 2 ). The move toward more horizontal policies is far from straightforward. It affects the balance of power between actors in society; at its core, it involves finding the economic rents that have built up over the years and cutting them back; it attacks the economic privilege that some have enjoyed for generations. Thus, it is hardly surprising that MENA has found moving toward more horizontal industrial policy a profoundly difficult task.
As noted in section II, in many cases pre-reform economic elites have proven to be resilient to the reform process even when policy reforms were designed to reduce their rent seeking opportunities -like those shifts aimed at moving toward horizontal industrial 
V. Where does MENA go from here?
The claim that industrial policy has retreated to the annals of history is largely exaggerated. Industrial policies continue to be used throughout the world, but its modalities and focus have been changing to reflect the reality of the new global economic 35 As mentioned by Heydemann (2004) Although the move toward horizontal policies in MENA threatens existing economic elites, it also offers them opportunities to shape reform in their interests. This is the role that the so-called networks of privilege take: not to remain in the sides of the reform process arena but to be an active participant. Shaping both the reform and benefits that come from it. But these networks, which have diverse interests and are formed through complex bargaining processes, imply additional degrees of uncertainty to the shape and outcome of the reform process. What are going to be the interactions between the government and the private sector to advance the reform process? Are these two groups going to be in cahoots or in competition for reform? Are reforms going to be the outcome of a transforming political process or the result of authoritarian rules? How are interest groups going to adapt and capture changes in policies? How much of the rents will remain in the pre-reform elite? These are the questions for future research. 1975-82 1983-1990 Source: Schwartz & Clements (1999) Note: based on SNA database, national authorities and authors calculation. The category 'developing countries' does not include Israel and South Africa, although the two countries are included in their geographical country groups. Subsides are here defines as cash-transfers to industries.
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